First Published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

_Derrida_ (2002) Directed by Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick UK Premiere: 31 January 2003.

Žižek! Directed by Astra Taylor. Zeitgeist Films, 2005, 71mins Derrida Directed by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman. Zeitgeist Films, 2002, 84mins.

This article charts Derrida’s performances in front of the camera and argues that several different film retellings of his 1982 imprisonment in Prague articulate the connections between spectrality and Law. If spectrality disrupts the binary of presence and absence, then we must not only show how there is a ghostly presence within the context of film viewing, but also how being photographed is a matter of embracing blindness and a postal logic. The Prague imprisonment was an intriguing event in Derrida’s (...) life because it seemed to go hand-in-hand with revoking his self-imposed ban on his public image, beginning with his first television interview on Antenne 2. Why does Derrida replay this scene, re-enact it, indefinitely? How does the recurring trope of blindness in his writings relate to both the imprisonment and the experience of being photographed? The television and film retellings in Ghost Dance (McMullen, 1983), D’ailleurs, Derrida (Fathy, 1999), and, finally, Derrida (Dick and Ziering Kofman, 2002) could be a way of changing the ghosts that haunt that scene: from fear and anguish in the first television version to openness towards the other in D’ailleurs, Derrida, where the place and time of the event are not named. (shrink)

There are many touch points between the work of Jacques Derrida and René Girard. To me, as a student of literature, these two writers particularly stand out as great readers or great exegetes.1 The way they handle and combine texts, the way they dare to break with reading conventions, has proved to be really fruitful.Some time ago I watched a documentary about Derrida, made by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, published in 2002, carrying the simple title Derrida.2 (...) I found that this experimental documentary at the same time reflected Derrida’s many reservations, not to say his skepticism, as to the possibility of making portraits—and—proved to be far more revealing, even intimate, than a conventional documentary... (shrink)

In her opening chapter on Marx, Kofman provides a reading of inversion as necessary to the ideological process. She then explores the metaphor of the camera obscura in Freud's description of the unconscious.

The Sarah Kofman Reader is a comprehensive anthology of significant essays and book excerpts by the postwar French philosopher and theorist Sarah Kofman (1934-1994).

Pogge, O'Neill, Elkins, and others propose the "dispersal" or "unbundling" of state sovereignty, allegedly to disincentivize war, to foster global and regional cooperation on environment, justice, and other issues of naturally supra-state concern, as well as to tailor some functions or jurisdictions to more local, regional, or differently shaped geographical areas. All these proposals are guilty of function-atomism, i.e. they ignore the massive benefits of clustering identically bounded functions or jurisdictions in a single territory. These benefits include the effective enforcement (...) of law; the effective production of public goods and deterrence of free-riding; the coinciding of the tax base, law formation and enforcement and sustaining community of media, schools, universities, and other vital institutions; and the fostering of democratic community and participation in a significant political structure. (shrink)

Morale et mysogynie. L'auteur démontre que la subjectivité masculine s'active à l'intérieur du discours prétendument universel des philosophes (Kant et Rousseau), spécialement lorsqu'ils traitent de la problématique des sexes qui traverse toute culture.

More than a record of dramatic incidents and daring personalities, this book adds significantly to our understanding of how the United States fought World War II. It demonstrates that the extent, and limitations, of secret intelligence ...

Daniel Kofman | : La littérature philosophique récente concernant les droits juridictionnels suppose qu’on puisse les justifier par une « théorie des droits territoriaux », sans faire appel à une théorie de l’autodétermination. Or les principes d’autodétermination des peuples devraient déterminer les principes des frontières juridictionnelles, et non le contraire. Les « droits territoriaux » sont essentiellement des droits de gouvernance, lesquels découlent eux-mêmes des principes d’autodétermination. Pour défendre ces thèses, je critique les arguments de Brilmayer, Simmons, et Stilz. (...) | : Recent philosophical literature on jurisdictional rights assumes they can be justified by a “theory of territorial rights” without a theory of self-determination. However, principles of self-determination of peoples should determine principles of jurisdictional boundaries, not the contrary. “Territorial rights” are essentially rights of governance, which derive from principles of self-determination. I support these theses by criticising arguments of Brilmayer, Simmons and Stilz. (shrink)

This book shows how such an approach fails to interrogate the precise terms, such as "Nature" or "life", that Nietzsche used in place of "being," and to ask the meaning of this substitution.

Socrates is an flusive figure, Sarah Kofman asserts, and he is necessarily so since he did not write or directly state his beliefs. Kofman suggests that Socrates' avowal of ignorance was meant to be ironic. Later philosophers who interpreted his text invariably resisted the profoundly ironic character of his way of life and diverged widely in their interpretations of him. Kofman focuses especially on the views of Plato, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.

La 4ème de couverture indique : « Peut-on se sortir de ce que Platon appelle une aporie? de cette situation intenable, cauchemardesque où, comme tombé dans les profondeurs d’un puits, vous êtes soudainement désorienté, dépourvu de toute ressource? où vous êtes piégé, encerclé, paralysé, prisonnier dans les ténèbres sans issue des liens inextricables de la mort? Peut-on sortir d’une situation infernale? Trouver un poros, c’est-à-dire inventer un stratagème, pour faire cesser la détresse, tracer un chemin qui mène de l’obscurité à (...) la lumière? La philosophie est, pour Platon, ce poros salvateur : entreprise prométhéenne, elle est, grâce au feu dialectique, technique d’immortalité. La partie autobiographique de ce texte, intitulée Cauchemar, l’enracine dans les ténèbres d’une enfance particulièrement aporétique. ». (shrink)

La 4ème de couverture indique : « Le portrait de Dorian Gray, exhibé dès les premières pages du livre de Wilde auquel il donne son titre, fascine d’emblée le lecteur. La lecture proposée ici souligne que ce portrait, pour ainsi dire jeté en pâture, sert d’écran ou de paravent à un autre portrait encore plus séducteur et inquiétant, en général moins remarqué, celui de la mère morte, représentée en bacchante, qui le hante secrètement. Outre L’imposture de la beauté, ce recueil (...) comprend une étude sur Le Moïse de Michel-Ange de Freud : Un autre Moïse, ou la Force de la loi ; deux lectures consacrées à Nietzsche : Nietzsche et Wagner, Nietzsche et Voltaire (Et pourtant elle tremble!) ; Un battu imbattable, à propos de Larmes de clown, du cinéaste Victor Sjöström ainsi que Angoisse et catharsis, sur The Lady Vanishes, d’Alfred Hitchcock. ». (shrink)

Unlike the many services already transformed by artificial intelligence (_AI_), the financial advice sector remains committed to a human interface. That is surprising as an AI-powered financial advisor (a _robo-advisor_) can offer personalised financial advice at much lower cost than traditional human advice. This is particularly important for those who need but cannot afford or access traditional financial advice. Robo-advice is easily accessible, available on-demand, and pools all relevant information in finding and implementing an optimal financial plan. In a perfectly (...) competitive market for financial advice, robo-advice should prevail. Unfortunately, this market is imperfect with asymmetric information causing generalised advice aversion with a disproportionate lack of trust in robo-advice. Initial distrust makes advice clients reluctant to use, or switch to, robo-advice. This paper investigates the ethical concerns specific to robo-advice underpinning this lack of trust. We propose a regulatory framework addressing these concerns to ensure robo-advice can be an ethical resource for good, resolving the increasing complexity of financial decision-making. Fit for purpose regulation augments initial trust in robo-advice and supports advice clients in discriminating between high-trust and low-trust robo-advisors. Aspiring robo-advisors need to clear four licensing gateways to qualify for an AI Robo-Advice License (AIRAL). Licensed robo-advisors should then be monitored for ethical compliance. Using a balanced score card for ethical performance generates an ethics rating. This _gateways-and-ratings_ methodology builds trust in the robo-advisory market through improved transparency, reduced information asymmetry, and lower risk of adverse selection. (shrink)

Kofman traces Rousseau's argument that women's role as mothers requires the subordination of women to men, and the companion argument that women's lust is a threat to the social order, which also justifies the confinement of women within the home. She then relates the claim that women so confined exert a power of their own to Rousseau's erotic obsession with dominant, but maternal, women. Thus, the “Nature” to which Rousseau appeals is seen to be both a reflection of his (...) own specific nature and representative of all phallocratic discourse in its defense of male domination. (shrink)

One of a handful of texts written by Sarah Kofman in the interim between the publication of her Explosion, a 700-page analysis of Ecce Homo, and her sudden death in 1994, ‘And Yet It Q...

Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, or precisely exhibiting (...) value in light of relevant (actual or hypothetical) facts. In examples where no subsumption occurs, actual facts trivially become hypothetical facts in "fact-insensitive" conditionals, an empty formalism. Indeed, Rawls’ grounding of principles of justice in “conditions of life” can easily be reformulated as a conditional principle “sensitive” only to hypothetical such conditions, and thus formally fact-insensitive in Cohen's sense, for all Cohen’s ire against Rawls’s grounding.Moreover, any plausible “ultimate fact-insensitive principle” must be intricately qualified, which tacit ceteris paribus clauses mask. Each qualification implies prioritisation of one principle over another in conceivable circumstances, and wherever the now qualified principle is given scope, that too implies prioritisation over competing principles in typical circumstances. Any principle is thus sensitive to conceivable circumstances of application, as recognised by more sophisticated intuitionisms. Non-trivial ultimate principles – luck egalitarianism, act utilitarianism, etc. - require defense, which inevitably involves showing how they best interpret and respond to facts about human needs, goals, and capacities in predictable circumstances. Finally, the substantive debate between Rawls and Cohen about which facts are relevant to the DP is only obscured by the doctrine of fact-insensitivity. (shrink)

A common theme from certain circles during the Yugoslav wars was that the seceding republics lacked a right to secede, but that if a right were accorded them by the EC or international community, it would have to be granted to the Serbian minorities in these republics, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on pain of inconsistency. This microcosm argument is in fact unsound. On a reasonable conception of a right of self-determination and secession elaborated here, the Republic of Bosnia and (...) Herzegovina enjoyed a right of secession, while Bosnian Serbs did not. Nor did Bosnian Serbs restrict their claim to such a right to territories in which they held a majority; rather, they demanded "secession" for a whole swathe of lands which lacked even a Serb plurality before their brutal "ethnic cleansing". Either voluntarist or ethnicist conceptions of a right of secession might have been construed as supporting the microcosm argument, but both of those are terrible conceptions of the right of self-determination and secession. (shrink)

Stressful life situations can impair or facilitate various cognitive functions. In the present study, the effect of examination stress on students was examined using two executive function tasks, task-switching and the Stroop task, in a between-subject crossover design. Students showed increased anxiety in the 2 week period prior to exams compared to the beginning of the semester, manifested as higher scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Scale and a shift to more sympathetic activation when heart rate variability was assessed. During (...) the stressful period, the switching cost was reduced on a spatial task-switching paradigm and reaction times in the Stroop task were faster. This is the first study to show stress-induced facilitation of performance on these executive function tasks. (shrink)

In response to the spread of COVID-19, governments across the world have, with very few exceptions, enacted sweeping restrictive lockdown policies that impede citizens’ freedom to move, work, and assemble. This paper critically responds to the central arguments for restrictive lockdown legislation. We build our critique on the following assumption: public policy that enjoys virtually unanimous support worldwide should be justified by uncontroversial moral principles. We argue that that the virtually unanimous support in favor of restrictive lockdowns is not adequately (...) justified by the arguments given in favor of them. Importantly, this is not to say that states ought not impose restrictive lockdown measures, but rather that the extent of the acceptance of these measures is not proportionate to the strength of the arguments for lockdowns. -/- We begin by exploring the case for restrictive lockdowns. We first argue that several of the principles that are used to justify the lockdowns yield unexpectedly revisionary implications for other political problems that many would be unwilling to accept. We then outline what we consider the strongest argument for a lockdown—namely, that its net welfare benefits are great enough to defeat the moral presumption against restricting citizens’ civil liberties to move, work, and assemble. However, we give a number of reasons for doubting that the lockdown’s net welfare benefits are, in fact, sufficiently high to defeat the presumption against it. (shrink)

In general, it is morally wrong to joke about the suffering of a category of people while in front of a person who fits into this category. I argue that, when people play the game Cards Against Humanity, it is likely that they do this very action. Thus, I conclude that it is morally wrong to play Cards Against Humanity.